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on filing fees and greatest reliance on a petition system which would require
candidates to prove that they indeed have a reasonable amount of support.
William David Burdett
The Amish Prevail Over Compulsory Education Laws:
Wisconsin v. Yoder
Defendants, members of the Old Order Amish Religion, refused to send
their children, ages fourteen and fifteen, to school after completion of the
eighth grade. The parents were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory
school attendance law.' On appeal, they complained that the law interfered
with their religious beliefs and was, therefore, invalid as an infringement
upon the free exercise of their religion, guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution.! The Wisconsin Supreme Court
determined that the state's interest in requiring education until the age of six-
teen did not override the defendants' right to the free exercise of their religion,
and reversed the convictions.! The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari." Held, affirmed: The state's interest in requiring a minimum degree of
education of its children is a valid state interest, but in the special circumstances
presented by the Amish sect, the first and fourteenth amendments prevent
the State of Wisconsin from compelling the defendants' children to attend
formal high school to age sixteen. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
I. THE STATE'S INTEREST VERSUS THE INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The first amendment guarantee of freedom of religion has traditionally
been considered one of the most valued of the substantive liberties guaranteed
by the Constitution." This protection has been extended by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to prevent the states from depriving in-
dividuals of their religious freedoms.! This first amendment right does not go
unfettered, however, as it is subject to the reasonable exercise of a state's police
power, especially in areas where the public health and safety are involved.7
The method of determining which of these interests, the state's or the indi-
'WIS. STAT. § 118.15 (Spec. Pamphlet 1972).
' "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment extends this prohibition and makes it applicable to the states. Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
'State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
4402 U.S. 994 (1971).
'See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
"[R]eligious freedom-the freedom to believe and practice strange and, it may be, foreign
creeds-has classically been one of the highest values of our society."
"Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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vidual's, overrides the other, is a balancing procedure.8 The line which has been
traditionally drawn in this balancing process is that between beliefs and ac-
tions! The freedom to believe is absolute; actions, though, are generally thought
subject to state regulation, even when sincerely supported by religious beliefs."
In affirming the conviction of a Mormon polygamist, the Supreme Court of
the United States held in Reynolds v. United States that although "[ljaws
cannot . . . interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with
practices."11 For decades thereafter, the assertion of the free exercise of religion
defense failed in state prosecutions ranging from disturbance of the peace
violations" to palm reading."' In 1925, however, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters4
the Supreme Court found that an Oregon statute requiring parents and guard-
ians to send their children only to public schools was an extreme interference
with the right of parents to direct the course of their children's education and
religious training. Likewise, the "flag-salute" case of the 1940's held that a
student's right to refuse to salute the United States flag because of his religious
beliefs far outweighed the state's interest in fostering patriotism." Still, in 1944,
the Court refused to reverse the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness who had vio-
lated a Massachusetts statute by directing her minor ward to distribute religious
material on the streets.' The Court held that the defendant's free exercise
defense must yield to Massachusetts' power as parens patriae to provide for the
welfare of the child.
In 1963, the Court in Sherbert v. Verner" formulated a two-fold test to
' In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961), the Court indicated that "to make
accommodation between religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly
difficult task . See also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69 (1964).
9 Thomas Jefferson, as early as 1786, had noted the possibility that some actions, based
upon religious beliefs, would disrupt the "peace and good order," and when that occurred,
a government could lawfully interfere. T. JEFFERSON, An Act for Establishing Religiou?
Freedom, in 2 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 300, 302 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds.
1903). See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
"Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Courts, in determining rights under
the free exercise clause, must take care not to run afoul of the establishment clause. Thomas
Jefferson stated that the establishment of religion clause of the first amendment was re-
sponsible for "building a wall of separation between Church and State." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, Jan. 1, 1802, in 16 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 9, at 281-82. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally Harding, Re-
ligious Liberty: The Source of Freedom?, 11 Sw. L.J. 169 (1957). The courts are forced to
recognize this wall of separation when examining a law challenged upon infringement of
free exercise grounds and look at the possibility of aiding the establishment of the religion.
In addition, courts must consider other incidental rights and powers found in the subject
matter of the litigation; for example, the parent's interest in the religious upbringing of
his child was a consideration in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
198 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). See also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
"2State v. White, 64 N.H. 48, 5 A. 828 (1886).
"McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Crim. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922).
14268 U.S. 510 (1925). An earlier, equally important case decided by the Supreme
Court during this period was Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), in which the
conviction of a schoolteacher for violating a Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of a
language other than English was reversed on the grounds that the statute was arbitrary and
interfered with individual fundamental rights.
" West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
"Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
' 374 U.S. 398 (1963). This decision was termed by one author to be the "dawn of
a new day for religious freedom claims." Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United
States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 241.
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determine whether a state's secular interest predominated over an individual's
religious liberty. It was first necessary to determine whether the law in question
imposed a burden on the free exercise of religion, and, if so, whether some
compelling state interest justified the substantial infringement of the first
amendment rights. The state's interest, said the Court, should triumph only
when the "gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation" of religious liberties.'
Historically speaking, courts have generally concentrated on three facets
of this state interest-religious freedoms conflict. First, they have investigated
the nature and purpose of the law in question. Where the religion-oriented
conduct constituted a threat to the public safety, peace, or order, and the pur-
pose of the law was to safeguard these public interests, the religious liberty
claims generally yielded to the state's interest."9 A second area of focus was the
degree of the burden that the law exerted upon the free exercise of the religion.
Where the religious practice itself was not made unlawful by the state law,
then only an "indirect" burden was said to exist, and the law was upheld."0
Finally, courts have increasingly probed beyond the religious conduct itself
to determine the validity of the religious claims. Both the sincerity of the
claimants in their beliefs and practices, 1 and the centrality, or importance, of
the activities sought to be regulated have received attention from the courts."
II. THE COMPELLING INTEREST OF STATES'
COMPULSORY EDUCATION LAWS
Since 1647, when Massachusetts passed an act establishing the first public
schools in America,2" the importance of the state's interest in education has not
1' 374 U.S. at 406.
9 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d
65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Wright v. DeWitt School Dist. No. 1,
238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965) (regulations requiring vaccinations of citizens or
public school children); Powers v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 208 Kan. 605, 493 P.2d
590 (1972) (medical examinations required as a condition for receiving welfare benefits);
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (court orders demanding that blood transfusions be ad-
ministered to an unwilling Jehovah's Witness patient); Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14 (1946) (violations of the Mann Act); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 903 (1969); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599,
148 S.E.2d 565 (1966) (narcotics convictions). However, where the public goals were
found to be less compelling and there was no threat to public safety or order, the state's
law would not be enforced. See, e.g., In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, re-
manded, 375 U.S. 14, rev'd on rehearing, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) (juror
could refuse to serve because of religious beliefs); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)
(test for office of notary public could not require applicant to declare his belief in God);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (city tax could not be levied on Jehovah's
Witnesses distributing religious material).
20Three states' Sunday closing laws were held to be only indirect burdens on the free
exercise of religion. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
2'United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding that under the particular cir-
cumstances involved it was not error to refuse to submit to the jury the question of the
sincerity of the defendants' beliefs).
'See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See also Casad, Compulsory High
School Attendance and the Old Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garher, 16 KAN.
L. REV. 423 (1968).
"See generally Comment, The Right Not To Be Modern Men: The Amish and Com-
pulsory Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 925, 930 (1967).
diminished.' The state, as parens patriae, uses these compulsory education
laws to protect children from unwise decisions made by themselves or their
parents, until they are old enough to decide for themselves." The majority of
states have compulsory education statutes requiring a child to attend school
until a certain age or to a certain grade." If a non-public school is attended,
the alternate mode of education must meet minimal standards equivalent to
those of that state's public instruction."' The importance of the state's interest
in promoting compulsory education has been reflected in the many judicial
decisions which have upheld the validity of these laws in the face of a variety
of attacks.'
The compulsory education statutes have frequently been attacked by various
religious groups as violations of the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. 9 The refusal by members of the Amish sect to send their children to
school past the eighth grade has resulted in many state prosecutions." The
particular value system of the Amish, involving their ideas of self-sufficiency3
and separation from the worldliness of contemporary society, has been argued
as reason enough for an exception to the laws."2 Although the Amish are not
against all secular education, believing in the need for learning the basic skills
(reading, writing, etc.) necessary in their community, they do oppose a high
school education because of the exposure their children receive to contemporary
societal values opposed to their own." This exposure will, the Amish contend,
lead to the disintegration of their religious communities. 4
2
4 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
"Casad, Cornpulsory Education and Individual Rights, in 5 RELIGIONS AND THE PUB-
LIC ORDER 51, 79-83 (D. Gianella ed. 1969).
28 The statutes of Colorado and the District of Columbia permit children, upon reaching
a certain age or grade limit, to be excused from school upon the condition that they engage
in lawful employment. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123-20-5, 80-6-1 to 80-6-2 (1963);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-202, 36-201 to 36-228 (1967).
"1See State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51
(1967); State v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 814 (1960).
28 See, e.g., People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954); Meyerworth v. State, 173 Neb. 889,
115 N.W.2d 585 (1962). Religion was not at issue in these cases.
"E.g., State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); Commonwealth v. Smoker,
177 Pa. Super. 435, 110 A.2d 740 (1955); Commonwealth v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136,
70 A.2d 693 (1950).
"See Comment, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments,
1971 Wis. L. REv. 832, 835.
" The Amish have been exempted from payment of social security taxes as a tribute to
their self-sufficiency. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(h)-I (1970).
22 See Comment, supra note 30, at 832. The Amish regard this forbearance and separa-
tion from contemporary society as essential for their spiritual salvation.
3The contemporary social values of worldliness and competitiveness are at direct odds
with Amish values of humility and obedience to the will of God. See Comment, supra
note 30, at 834.
" It has been asserted that the large consolidated schools, speech, customs, and comforts
of contemporary society threaten the Amish in particular to a greater extent than other
religious groups. See Comment, supra note 23, at 948. It is interesting to note that special
statutory relief for the Amish has been granted in several states. For example, in Pennsyl-
vania broad exceptions to the compulsory education statute allow school administrators wide
discretion in granting exemptions or devising alternative plans, such as a work-study pro-
gram, for Amish children fourteen years or older. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, S 13-1330 (Supp.
1972). Other states have modified their compulsory education laws by providing for ex-
emptions or at least less rigid treatment of the Amish. Iowa provides that exemptions may
be granted by the state superintendent of public education and are renewable each year,
19721 NOTES
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However, until 1971, state supreme courts generally upheld these com-
pulsory education laws in spite of the Amish free exercise claims, basing their
decisions on the belief-action distinction.' One case in particular, State v.
Garber,' is especially noteworthy, being the first instance in which Amish
claims were asserted against a state's attendance law following the Supreme
Court's holding in Sherbert v. Verner." The Kansas Supreme Court, however,
overlooked the Sherbert test, basing its decision on the strict rationale that
because the law presented no infringement on the right of the Amish pe-
titioners to "believe or worship" in the religion of their choice, there was no
denial of religious freedom. The decision received criticism for the Kansas
court's complete disregard of the Sherbert test,3' but the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.3"
III. WISCONSIN V. YODER
In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Amish respondents convinced the Court through
the use of sociological data and the testimony of expert witnesses that "the Old
Order Amish religion pervades and determines virtually their entire way of
life...."' By equating their way of life to their religion, the Amish demon-
strated that the Wisconsin attendance law, which required school attendance
until the age of sixteen, presented not only an infringement upon their religious
liberty, but a real threat to the very existence of their society and faith, in
subjecting their children to the secular values attendant with secondary edu-
cation. The sincerity of their beliefs and the importance of the "role that
belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of the Old Order
Amish communities and their religious organization," were cited as further
reasons for sustaining the claims of the Amish."'
The Court initially rejected Wisconsin's contention that the belief-action
distinction be strictly applied, stating that actions were not always outside the
protection of the free exercise clause." The implication of the Court's language
was that the distinction had best be laid to rest, at least as an all-purpose
talisman for determining these conflicts."' The Court agreed that a certain
amount of education was necessary for a citizen to participate effectively in
America's political system, and that it enabled a child to become a self-reliant,
conditioned upon proof that the child has sustained a basic level of achievement in the
"basic skills." IOWA CODE § 299.24 (Supp. 1972). Kansas requires that upon completion
of the eighth grade, exempted children must participate in parent-supervised work-study
programs. KAN. STAT. ANN. S 72-1111 (Supp. 1970).
I See, e.g., State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955); Com-
monwealth v. Smoker, 177 Pa. Super. 435, 110 A.2d 740 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951); In re Marsh, 140 Pa. Super. 472, 14
A.2d 368 (1940); Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948); see text
accompanying notes 9, 10 supra.
' 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967).
37374 U.S. 398 (1963); see notes 17-18 supra, and accompanying text.
3" See Casad, supra note 22.
59389 U.S. 51 (1967).
40406 U.S. at 216.
"I Id. at 235.
"a Id. at 219-20. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
4"f[Ijn this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compart-
ments." 406 U.S. at 220.
[Vol, 26
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self-sufficient contributing member of society. However, these assertions were
only true when applied to the bulk of society; when applied to the unique
Amish situation, the state's interest appeared less substantial. The Court
reasoned that an additional one or two years' instruction did relatively little
to accomplish the goals of the state, and that the skills attained through an
eighth grade education were all that were necessary for a contributing life in
Amish society. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the Amish trait of
self-sufficiency had received federal governmental notice before." Although
Wisconsin noted the potential plight of an, Amish child who might leave the
Amish community for contemporary society with only an eighth-grade educa-
tion, the Court answered that the Amish qualities of "reliability, self-reliance,
and dedication to work," would surely find ready acceptance by potential em-
ployers.'
Wisconsin relied on Prince v, Massachusetts" as authority for the state's
power to provide for the welfare of its youths, even over their parents' wishes.
Sherbert v. Verner,4 the Court noted, had restricted Prince and the state's po-
sition as parens patriae to situations in which the physical or mental health of
the child, or the peace, safety, or welfare of the public, were endangered.'
Instead, the decision in Pierce v. Society of Sistersn " was found to be control-
ling. The decision in Pierce stated that when the interests of the parent in
guiding the religious and educational training of the child were coupled with
the individual's rights of religious liberty, the state's interest in the conduct
must be more compelling than merely having a "reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the state."5 In Yoder, Wisconsin's interest
was determined not to be compelling in the light of the respondents' evidence
which effectively undermined the state's arguments.
The Court, ruling for the respondents, qualified the scope of their decision
by advancing two caveats. The first was a warning to courts in the future to
tread gently in this area, stressing the uniqueness of the Amish situation,'
perhaps fearing that the decision would open the floodgates to numerous free
exercise claims for exemptions from attendance laws. Secondly, the Court
stated that Yoder should not be construed as a judicial undermining of the
states' compulsory education laws; rather, the Court suggested that the state
devise reasonable standards to provide for informal continuing education for
Amish children past the eighth grade, without impairing their free exercise of
religion."
"See note 31 supra.
1406 U.S. at 224.
"321 U.S. 158 (1944); see note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
47374 U.S. 398 (1963).
4 406 U.S. at 230.
"9268 U.S. 510 (1925); see note 14 supra, and accompanying text. The Yoder Court
said that Pierce "stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing
of their children." 406 U.S. at 233.
"°268 U.S. at 535.
"' The Court warned that the Amish had presented a "convincing showing, one that
probably few other religious groups or sects could make." 406 U.S. at 235-36.
" The Court noted the states' past history of "amicable and effective relationships with
church-sponsored schools," and suggested "continuing vocational education of Amish chil-
dren under parental guidance," as a solution. 406 U.S. at 236. See note 34 supra.
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Another argument advanced by Wisconsin was that a decision granting an
exemption to the Amish from the compulsory education law would ignore the
substantive rights of Amish children by depriving them of any choice if they
desired to continue their education past the eighth grade. This was an appealing
contention especially in light of the Court's increasing recognition in recent
decisions of the constitutional rights of students and minors." The Supreme
Court, however, determined that the substantive rights of the children were
not at issue in Yoder. Only the parents were subject to prosecution in this
criminal proceeding; the children were not parties to the litigation. 4 Further-
more, the Court noted that the record in Yoder was bare of any inference that
the particular parents in the litigation were acting contrary to their children's
wishes in keeping them home from school following completion of the eighth
grade." The Court insisted that its decision in Yoder could not be construed as
any resolution of conflicting interests between parents and children; these
differences would best be resolved in state courts in the future.
In the final analysis, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Supreme Court
implicitly intended for Yoder to stand for a broadening of free exercise rights,
or whether it intended merely to distinguish its past holdings in the state
interest-religious liberty area with the special situation presented by the Amish
claims. It is obvious, however, that the Court did attempt to narrow the scope
of its holding to prevent a deluge of free exercise claims against school com-
pulsory attendance laws. The Court characterized the Amish as a unique re-
ligious group; it vindicated states' compulsory education laws and kept the
focus only on the eighth-grade to age-sixteen period; and, rather disappoint-
ingly it refused to consider the substantive rights of the children who will be
ultimately affected by the Yoder decision.
It seems ironic that the Court dealt with the rights of the Amish parents
in such a broad manner, yet denied any assertion of the children's rights. The
Court should have more realistically appraised the small likelihood of fourteen-
year-old Amish children protesting their parents' refusal to allow them to
attend school. The result of the holding may be the educational suffocation of
many Amish children who realize this fact too late in their lives.' Although
-"See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (the right of stu-
dents to freedom of speech recognized); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (defendant
in a juvenile proceeding can be convicted only upon proof beyond a shadow of a doubt);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (recognition of constitutionally protected due process rights
in juvenile proceedings). See also Gyory, Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40
FORDHAM L. REv. 201 (1971).
"1406 U.S. at 230-31.
5 1Id. at 231.
"Justice Douglas dissented from the majority holding that the children's rights were
not involved in the litigation. The difficulty with the majority's reasoning, he stated, is due
to the narrow scope of the holding, which concentrated upon the state on one side and the
parents on the other, resulting in the children's free exercise rights being pre-empted by
those of their parents. Because "no analysis of religious-liberty claims can take place in a
vacuum," Douglas suggested that the children's views be canvassed in the present litigation
since the children would have "no other effective forum" to voice their opinions. 406 U.S.
at 242. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that Justice Douglas did agree with the ma-
jority's disapproval of any strict application of the belief-action distinction, noting that Yoder
would open the way "to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed,"
and predicting an eventual overthrow of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(see note 11 supra, and accompanying text). 406 U.S. at 247.
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